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South Carolina is fortunate in being faced with few potential sources of interstate water
conflict because of its relative geographic isolation. The state shares boundaries with only
two other states. The headwaters of most of South Carolina's rivers are in North Carolina ,
but no serious conflicts are on the horizon there. Conflicts have already emerged between
Hilton Head, Beaufort and Savannah over drawing down the coastal aquifer and threatening
s a Ii n e int ru s ion.
The major potential source of interstate conflict at the present time is over the right
to the waters of the Savannah River, and protection of the quality of that water. The Savannah
is a major resource for both states in terms of water supply, recreation, and hydropower.
A significant third partner to both states is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which has
developed Hartwell Lake and Clark Hill and is currently developing the Russell Dam project.
While the two riparian states have claims along the length of the river, the Corps is a
substantial riparian owner, since it has purchased all of the land adjacent to the lakes.
In Western states, interbasin conflicts are frequently over irrigation. In the rainy
Southeast, irrigation is not a major source of water demands. The waters of the Savannah are
used for municipal water supply, for industrial purposes, and for hydropower and
recreation. The dams operated by the Corps have a significant effect on water levels in the
lakes (and therefore on its recreational use) and on flows over and below the dams, related
to hydropower use. The city of Atlanta is reputedly looking to the Savannah as a future source
of urban water as the city continues to expand.

Industrial development in the upper

Savannah, particularly on the South Carolina side, will undoubtedly call for substantial .
water use, even if most of it returns to the flow. Future development along the Savannah may
.

be contingent on the ability to guarantee adequate water supplies for industrial, commercial,
and residential users, as well as hydroelectric power and recreational opportunities
associated with the Corps-developed lakes and dams.
While most of the interstate agreements in this paper addressed surface water issues,
the allocation to rights to the aquifer could potentially lead to interstate negotiations of some
kind. Efforts to negotiate such a compact would be complicated, however, by the fact that
there are three states--North , Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia--sharing a major
river basin (the Savannah) and four states--Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina
•

--sharing the aquifer.
In order to review the options available to South Carolina to protect the state's interests
in access to the waters of the Savannah, we briefly review the interstate water agreements,
commissions, and compacts entered into by other states. 1 These will identify some potential
methods for addressing interstate water relations along the Savannah.

The most widely used device is the interstate compact, which was authorized by the
Constitution as an alternative to litigation for resolving interstate conflicts. 2 Twenty-one
such compacts were entered into prior to 1900, all of them to resolve boundary disputes
between states. Sixteen more came into being by 1920, with increasing use of multistate
compacts and more diversity of issues. This period saw the first such compact creating an
interstate administrative agency, the New York-New Jersey Port Authority. Twenty more
developed between 1920 and 1940, with more emphasis on water conflicts and other natural
resource issues. Between 1941 and 1975 more than 100 additional compacts were signed· 3

The Colorado
The oldest and most complex interstate agreement governs the Colorado River, whose
basin includes eight states and which empties into the Gulf of California. The upper basin
has been governed by an interstate compact since 1922; subsequent compacts, treaties, and
court decisions have allocated the water between the Upper and Lower Colorado basins,
among the states, and between the U.S. and Mexico. The purposes of these compacts and
treaties are to provide for flood control, irrigation, and protection of water quality,
especially from increasing salinity. Original estimates of the average annual flow of the
Colorado were too high, so that the apportionment of the waters exceeded the actual flow in
many years. Objectives have also changed over the course of the long history of conflict over
the rights to the Colorado.
I n the earIy ye a rs, dev e Io pm en t was the prima ry go a I ; in Iate r ye a rs, protection of
instream flow values for recreation and wildlife protection became more important. The
Colorado Compact has encouraged agricultural development in the West in areas where such
development would not be feasible without an artificially low price for water. This
subsidized price was the product of both Corps of Engineers water development projects on
the lake, and the limited use of market methods for allocating scarce water among competing
uses.
The states that are parties to these compacts are prior appropriations states. (California water law includes both prior appropriations and riparian elements). Thus, the
procedures embodied in the compact called for allocation to various states in quantity terms,
with provisions for reduced use during periods of low flow.
The original compact, the first such water compact to be negotiated and therefore a
model of sorts for later agreements, included the following major provisions:

( 1)

·

Apportioning the Colorado River system equally between the upper and lower
basins with 7.5 million acre feet per year to each basin;
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( 2)

Provision for Mexico's share to come from either excess flow or equally from the
shares of the two basins;

( 3)

Making navigational uses subordinate to domestic, agricultural, and power uses;

( 4)

Making agricultural and domestic uses prior claims over power uses;

( 5)

Protecting any pre-existing claims and the rights of Indian Tribes under treaties

•

Subsequent agreements allocated the waters among the various signatory states in each
basin. The Lower Basin Compact was signed in 1928 and the Upper Basin Compact in 1948.
Conflicts continue over the use of the Colorado. Current issues include the protection
of water quality (especially against salinity) and conservation measures. A broader issue
is the appropriate pricing of water and the excessive use of water for agricultural purposes
in an area with little rainfall.

The Columbia River
The Columbia River basin involves four states (Washington, Oregon, Utah, and
Montana) and a part of Canada. Issues in this river basin are flood control, impoundment for
agriculture, protection of fisheries, and hydropower. Unlike the Colorado (but like the
Savannah) the Columbia River basin is in a high rainfall area. An international treaty was
negotiated between the U.S. and Canada (Columbia River Treaty, 1964) in which Canada was
authorized to build three reservoirs for hydropower and flood control and to receive some
of the energy benefits created for the U.S. by Canadian impoundment.
There have been several organizations at various points in the history of this river
basin's development whose purposes were system management and cooperation. Currently
the the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission, created by the states in 1967 pursuant
to the provisions of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, coordinates resource
planning in the Columbia Basin. A companion group, the Columbia River Water Management
Group, manages and operates facilities in the basin. A federally funded agency, the Pacific
Northwest Regional Commission, also plays a significant role, particularly with respect to
federal developments in the river basin.
There is no interstate water compact on the Columbia. Although Congress has twice
passed enabling legislation for an interstate compact, five different legislative sessions over
a ten year period failed to ratify a compact. Although the idea of a compact is not dead, there
is little current interest in such a compact. Nevertheless, conflicts are building over the use
of the Columbia, and the lack of central coordination and overlap of three authorities is likely
to create problems in managing the Columbia basin in the future.
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The Yellowstone
The Yellowstone River, like the Savannah, is primarily a two state issue . It flows
through Wyoming and Montana before joining the Missouri at the North Dakota border. There
are no dams on the Yellowstone, limiting Corps involvement. The basin is almost equally
divided between Montana and Wyoming, with one percent in North Dakota. Use of the
Yellowstone itself is largely governed by laws enacted in Montana to balance the demands for
exploitation of strippable coal reserves with the interests of irrigation, municipal, and
industrial users as well recreational, esthetic, and fishery uses. Agriculture is the primary
consumptive use.
Montana is a permit state for water use. Under permits approved in the 1970s, about
60 percent of the river is reserved for inst ream flow. However, its allocations can
potentially be invalidated by two conflicting claims: Indian rights and the Yellowstone River
Compact.
This compact governs the waters of the river's four major tributaries and therefore
determines the flow in the Yellowstone itself which is allocated by Montana. The Yellowstone
Compact allocated water between the two states on the basis of a percentage of flow. Since
no determination of average flow was made for the compact, this cannot be readily converted
into acre-feet. The two states have not been able to come to terms on the respective shares.
The compact also prohibits diversion out of the basin without the consent of both states.
Refusal to agree has limited any such uses, primarily for development of coal resources.
Tt:ius, a failure to come to terms has meant that the compact has become a restriction on both
states and a potential source of future uncertainties over water rights rather than a device
to mitigate conflict and permit planned development.

The Arkansas
The Arkansas model is of particular interest because of the dominant federal role, a
situation which also exists along the Savannah. This river flows through two states,
Oklahoma and Arkansas, before joining the Mississippi at the Arkansas border. The Arkansas
is the site of the McClellan-Kerr Project of the Corps of Engineers. (The Arkansas project
is best known for making a seaport out of Tulsa, Oklahoma.) Prime concerns here are
balancing industrial development with fisheries and wildlife management, as well as flood
control, navigation, hydropower, and water supplies, much like the Savannah. The Arkansas
Red-White lntergency Committee provides cooperative relations between the two states and
the Corps, but no formal agencies exist for planning, management and coordination .
One interesting feature of the Arkansas Compact was that it was negotiated by subsec
tions of the river basin with two states negotiating at a time. Since the Arkansas involves
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both riparian and prior appropriations states, this process facilitated the reconciliation of

different types of water law.
The Washita River Basin
Texas is a party to more water compacts than any other states. In addition to the Washita,
it is a party to the Rio Grande, Pecos, Canadian, Sabine, and Red River Compacts. The Rio
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Grande involves an international treaty as well as interstate conflicts. The Pecos and Red
River Compacts are discussed below. The Sabine Compact is unusual in that the original
compact dealt with allocation only, but a later addition extended it to cover water quality
4

issues as well.
The Washita River flows through Texas and Oklahoma before joining the Red River. Like
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many western rivers, it alternates between periods of very high and very low flow. Flood
control and water quality management are two major issues along the Washita, as they are
on the Savannah. Because the area is highly agricultural, soil conservation and erosion are
also important issues, and conservation districts have provided a leadership role in

managing the river basin.
The Washita Valley Council was organized by the conservation districts in the two states
in the early 1940s and was successful in getting Congress to approve a flood control project
for the river. The Washita Council evolved into a planning agency with technical support
from the U.S. Soil and Conservation Service and the Oklahoma Conservation Commission.
The Washita served as a prototype of the river basin commission approach that developed
later, although it was conservation districts within states rather than state governments
that took the lead role in development cooperative arrangements across state lines.

The Ohio
The Ohio River Basin encompasses portions of ten eastern states. The Ohio River Basin
Commission evolved out of earlier interstate cooperation through ORSANCO (The Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Commission), which came into existence in 1948 as a cooperative
effort involving eight of the eleven states. (Three states, Tennessee, Maryland, and North
Carolina, have only a peripheral link to the basin.) A 1962 federal study strongly urged that
a permanent plannning organization for the basin be created. In 1971, the Ohio River Basin
Commission was farmed on petition of the governors of the eleven states underthe provisions
of Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act, creating a cooperative agency that
incorporated ORSANCO and involved the 11 states and ten federal agencies. The Commission
is responsible for coordinating all the water and related land plans in the basin, preparing
a plan

of

development for those

resources,
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priorities for
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implementation, detailed studies, preliminary investigations, and research and data
collection.
The makeup of the Commission is dicated by the Water Resources Planning Act. State
members are appointed by their respective governors, while federal members are ap
pointed by the Secretaries of each federal department. The Commission is chaired by a
presidential appointee. The vice chair is selected by the states. There is a technical staff.
Funding comes from both federal and state sources.

The Delaware
The Delaware basin is located in one of the most developed urban regions of the United
States. It involves the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware and is
governed by a commission created by the first interstate-federal compact. After some
controversy over making the federal government a party to such a compact, the Delaware
Basin Compact was finally ratified by Congress in 1962. The Commission has only five
members, one appointed by each governor and one by the President of the United States. The
Commission has vast powers to manage water resources in the basin. It has adopted a
comprehensive plan involving water quality management, storage, flood control, wetlands,
recreation, hydropower, groundwater protection, and allocation of water rights among
competing states. Revenues come from the Congress and the state legislatures as well as
federal grants. Because of the size and complexity of the basin, the Commission relies heavily
on the counterpart state agencies for research, implementation, and day-to-day manage
ment.
A similar interstate-federal compact was negotiated for the Susquehanna River Basin
in the same region, involving some of the same states. This compact was modelled on the
Delaware Compact.

The Connecticut
The Connecticut, flowing through four New England states, is one of the few major
multistate rivers with little in the way of an effective cooperative program. Litigation
resolved, or at least shelved, a conflict between Massachusetts and Connecticut over the
rights to divert a part of the flow of a tributary to the Connecticut to provide water supply
for the non-riparian city of Boston. There is a New England River Basins Commission with
little power or resources except to engage in broad, comprehensive planning, but with no
implementing authority. This Commission's proposal to create an interstate compact on the
Connecticut in 1954 met with no response.
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The Pecos
The Pecos River Compact involves some questions of interest to the Savannah basin
because this compact involves two states and both surface and groundwater issues. The Pecos
River Compact was signed in 1925 by Texas and New Mexico. Its stated purposes were to
remove sources of controversy, to protect existing developments within states, and to
facilitate the construction of works for water salvage, efficient use of water, and flood
protection.
The Commission created by the compact consists of one representative from each state
and one from the federal government. A major initial controversy that both states wanted to
construct dams for water storage and flood control. Federal representatives ensured that
each state acquired a dam. The compact allocated the waters between the states in western
fashion--by acre-feet of annual flow--but the terms of the compact were not clear about
the actual measured flow, leading to continuous conflict. A temporary resolution based on
1947 measurements was reached in 1948. In 1975, Texas sued New Mexico over the inter
pretation and implementation of the compact. A significant source of conflict is the
relationship between surface water and groundwater use in the basin.

New Mexico has

stringent groundwater use regulation, while groundwater use is essentially unregulated in
Texas. In addition to the groundwater issue and the dispute over the interpretation of the flow
allocation in the compact, it has been hampered by the fact that each state can veto any
commission action. Thus, the compact provides no meaningful way of resolving disputes. 5

Red River
The Red River flows through four states, two prior appropriations and two riparian
(Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana).

The prior appropriations states had the

advantage of better data on water flow and existing appropriations of water rights. The
compact was signed in 1978 after 22 years of negotiation·6
The Red River involved both quantity and quality issues as well as extensive controversy
over the role of the Federal government as a participant. While the states in the basin elected
to negotiate an interstate compact rather than an interstate-federal compact, the Federal
government played an important role in the negotiations.
The Red River Compact consists of 13 Articles. The purposes, specified in the first
art i c I e , are :

'
•

(a)

To promote interstate comity and remove causes of controversy between each of
the aftected states by governing the use, control and distribution of the interstate
water of the Red River and its tributaries;
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( b)

To provide an equitable apportionment among the Signatory States of the waters
of the Red River and its tributaries;

( c)

To promote an active program for the control and alleviation of natural deterio
ration and pollution of the water of the Red River Basin and to provide for
enforcement of the laws related thereto;

( d)

To provide the means for an active program for the conservation of water,
protection of lives and property from floods, improvement of water quality,
development of navigation and regulation of flows in the Red River Basin; and

( e)

To provide a basis for state or joint state planning and action by ascertaining and
identifying each state's share in the interstate water of the Red River Basin and
the apportionment thereof .7

The compact is administered by a nine-member interstate administrative, the Red
River Compact Commission, consisting of two representatives from each of the signatory
states and one federal commissioner appointed by the president who serves as ex-officio
chairman. If there is no federal appointee, the states may designate a chair. The commission
is empowered to hire employees, acquire property, and hire techical skills, but it is
dependent on the signatory states for funding.
These ten experiences in interstate cooperation in water basin management provide
some instructive examples for the management of the Savannah. The options range from
litigation or informal cooperation through a river basin commission to a formal compact,
either interstate or interstate/federal.
,

Interstate Water Agreements: The Savannah
(

The last 65 years have seen numerous compacts, commissions, agreements, and coop
erative arrangements between states sharing a common river basin. As we have seen , the
Colorado, the Columbia, the Ohio, the Delaware, the Red, the Pecos, and the Connecticut have
all been subject to negotiations with varying degrees of success. Blessed with an abundance
of water, the two states riparian to the Savannah (of the four states in its basin) have been
among the few not to negotiate rights to their shared river. In the interim, three major
federal projects for power, recreation, and flood control have been developed. Georgia has
substantially modified its water law with extensive use of permits, and South Carolina has
taken preliminary steps in the direction of permits. Atlanta is reputedly eyeing the
Savannah as an urban water source. Previous efforts at negotiation failed for lack of serious
interest. 8 Perhaps it is again time to consider an interstate arrangement of some kind .
If South Carolina is now interested in exploring its future rights to the flow of the
Savannah (and perhaps to the shared coastal aquifer as well), the available options are :
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(1)

the status quo. Do nothing.

( 2)

an informal agreement.

( 3)

a basin commission.

( 4)

an interstate compact.
(a) on surface waters only.
(b) on surface and groundwater.

( 5)

an interstate/federal compact.

Each of these options is explored briefly in this section.
In order to evaluate the alternatives, it is necessary to consider what the goals of an
interstate arrangement might be. Previous interstate agreements or compacts in other
states have served a variety of goals, but the overriding purpose has always been to clearly
define rights to a resource that is becoming increasingly scarce relative to the demands
placed on it, and to allocate those defined rights between the participating states. In some
river basins, scarcity is a permanent condition, while in others it is seasonal or only
intermittent with the occurrence of drought. It is possible that only seasonal or drought
conditions are presently at issue with respect to the Savannah, especially since irrigation
for agriculture is not a serious need in this region. Related objectives may be flood control,
preservation of instream values for fisheries and recreation, and water quality control. The
unique possibility for the Savannah is an arrangement dealing with both groundwater (the
coastal aquifer) and the river's surface water in a more successful fashion than the conflictplagued Pecos River Compact.
A second issue to consider is the degree of control to be delegated to a commission or
compact agency and the parties to be involved. Some arrangements are for planning only,
others for both planning and management.

Some arrangements delegate considerable

authority, while others reserve most decisions to the contracting states.

Option #1: The Status Quo
The status quo leaves the Savannah River largely to riparian owners. The largest
riparian owner by far is the Corps of Engineers, especially if shorelines of Corps-created
lakes along the Savannah are counted rather than just the shorelines of the original river.
The Corps now has three major developments on the Savannah .
The status quo is the solution most consistent with riparian doctrine allocating rights
to riparian owners on a shared basis, rather than making specific allocations of volume or
percent of flow. Federal courts are available to resolve any disputes to the rights of riparian
owners on either side to access to the flow. According to one writer,
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the courts generally

resolve such disputes over surface water on the basis of "equitable apportionment" between
the contesting states. Knowing that such recourse is available, a formal agreement may not
be necessary. This attitude was reflected in the case of the Connecticut River in New England.
Furthermore, the Corps has a profound impact on the level of flow, power generation,
recreational uses, flood control management, and water quality. Letting the Corps regulate
the use of the Savannah is a possible solution. Certainly many of the Corps' objectives-
power generation, recreational uses, and quality management--are shared by the adjoining
states.
Finally, unlike any other suggestion, the status quo involves no diminution whatsoever
in the sovereign authority of the State of South Carolina.
Drawbacks to the status quo, which relies on litigation to resolve any disputes, are
several. Some observers suggest that it may be time to move in the direction of anticipating
future conflicts and developing methods of resolving them.
The same writer on the courts' pattern in interstate surface water disputes also
observed that equitable apportionment is not always very concrete, and that consequently
this method of resolving disputes does not enable states to plan:

"Without the knowledge of how much water it is entitled to,
a sate loses the ability to prudently manage water resources
over time. Equitable apportionment requires consideration
of future uses, waste and conservation, and long-range plan
ning.10

Both South Carolina and Georgia continue to pursue industrial development. Except for
Savannah, Augusta, and Anderson, there is little development along the river. There is
considerable development potential for both tourism and manufacturing industry. Tourism
tends to place a high value of instream uses, with adequate clean water for domestic uses.
Industry is more likely to involve consumptive uses or water quality problems.

If

development occurs and population growth follows development, there will be increasing
demands for municipal water use. The use of riparian water for nonriparian purposes has
rarely been an issue in South Carolina, but it could become a bone of contention between state
users of the same stream. Both states also need to plan for development, and planning
increasingly requires an assured water supply. The status quo offers no such assurance.
The recent drought management act suggests that more careful management of this
major water resource is in order during dry spells. The state's ability to unilaterally
regulate the use of the waters of the Savannah during drought is limited when it is only one
of three independent powers with rights to the Savannah.
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Most formal agreements have arisen out of the perceived limitations of litigation as a
means of resolving disputes. In a now famous article, Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis
argued that" ... litigation had added confusion, not settlement" in such disputes because the
process"... is too static and too sporadic for adjusting a socioeconomic issue continuously
alivein an area embracing more than half a dozen states ... and also noted that the political
aspects of such disputes"... are not readily satisfied through litigation." 11 In general, the
issues are too complex to be resolved through the courts, which does not lend itself to the
kinds of tradeoffs of interests and concerns that political negotiations can produce.
Finally, there is obviously a link between groundwater usage and surface water. The
conflict between South Carolina and Georgia over groundwater is at the mouth of the
Savannah. Even if there is no agreement on surface water, the groundwater issue is coming
to a head. If South Carolina intends to consider an integrated approach to groundwater and
surface water management, the lower Savannah basin is the best place to start.

Option #2: An Informal Agreement
An informal, nonbinding agreement has been a tool used in other river basins, often as
a preliminary step to more formal agreements. The OR SAN CO agreement that evolved into the
Ohio River Basin Commission is a positive example; the Connecticut, which has failed to
evolve, is a negative one. Such agreements usually involve the exchange of informatior~,
identification of problems (and solutions) of mutual interest, and a forum for discussion of
any problems that might emerge over the common resource.
This option does not really preclude any of the others. It does not disturb the status quo,
except that it might pave the way for future agreements of a more substantive nature. There
is no meaningful delegation of authority. It would be a logical first step toward a more formal
agreement without necessarily implying that such an agreement is a part of the intended
agenda.

Option #3: A River Basin Commission
The river basin commission is an approach promoted by the Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965 authorizing regional and river basin commissions to which federal agencies
were a party. The Ohio River Basin Commission offers one good example. Such commissions
can be formed by concurrence of not Jess than half the states in a river basin. Georgia and
. South Carolina, for example, could form a Savannah River Basin Commission without the
participation of the other two states in the basin, Alabama and North Carolina. Such
commissions are already in existence in New England (with weak authority), the Great Lakes
(with international complications), the Ohio, three of the plains states (Minnesota, North
and South Dakota), and in the Pacific Northwest.
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A river basin commission is primarily a planning agency rather than a management one .
It provides a forum for discussion of issues and an arena in which conflicts can be resolved.
Lacking legislative powers (original or delegated) and management authority in most cases,
such a commission cannot deal very effectively with interstate conflicts over rights to either
surface water or groundwater. It is thus more suited to riparian states, where little water
management is practiced, than to prior appropriations or permit states, where day to day
management of quantity as well as quality plays a larger role. (Since Georgia has strong
permit system elements, it may no longer be appropriate to class it as a riparian state. South
Carolina has also grafted some permit elements onto a basically riparian system.)
At its best, a river basin commission would integrate existing agencies rather than
duplicating or displacing them; and decisions would be made by the chief executives (or their
designees) of the member states and the federal agencies. Such a commission functions best
when it is truly intergovernmental in every sense; its staff is intergovernmental, its
charter is approved by the laws of participating governments, and it avoids permitting
vetoes by any one party.
The federal preference for such agencies stems from the fact that unlike the multistate
compact, federal agencies can play a direct role, but they are less bound than by an
interstate/federal compact which involves an Act of Congress and the conditions of which
constitute federal law. Federal agencies generally have a broader knowledge base and more
financial resources on which to draw than their state counterparts and can thus exert
substantial influence in a river basin commission.
A river basin commission can work to alleviate problems of drought management, flood
control, and protection of water quality and instream uses. It can develop a plan for the future
development of the river basin which can be integrated into any state planning for water
resources and/or economic development in the contracting states. The Water Resources
Planning Act of 1965 specified six goals for which a river basin commission should strive:

(1)

Centralized decision making;

( 2)

Comprehensive planning;

( 3)

Coordinated plan implementation;

( 4)

Research coordination;

( 5)

Coordination of data management; and

( 6)

Citizen participation.

12

While some critics of river basin commissions feel that they are biased in favor of the
federal role, it is worth considering such an arrangement, as an intermediate if not a final
step, on the Savannah, which already has a commanding federal presence.
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Option #4: An Interstate Compact
An interstate compact is a formal agreement which becomes federal law when ratified
by Congress. Often Congressional consent is obtained in advance; at other times Congress
imposes conditions. Prior approval is helpful to the negotiating process, especially where
there are extensive federal interests involved.
Such compacts are normally negotiated by joint commissions or other groups repre
senting the various interests. While all states in a basin must be invited, they may decline
to participate if their interest is limited. The draft compact is then enacted as legislation
in identical form in each signatory state and ratified by Congress. The compact normally
describes the purpose, establishes an administrative agency and describes its composition,
powers, functions and duties. Provisions regarding terminationk, withdrawal and modifi
cation are normally included .
Once ratified, the compact is then binding on the parties; it overrides any inconsistent
state law. Such a compact involves substantially more surrender of state sovereignty than
the first three solutions. An interstate compact requires the consent of all states in the basin
and would thus require the participation of Alabama and North Carolina as well.
An interstate compact creates both a planning agency and a management agency with
delegated powers granted by the legislatures of the contracting states. It is authorized to
allocate the waters among competing uses, to regulate quality, provide protection for
instream uses, make decisions about the use of water for hydropower and other purposes,
regulate transfers of water rights among users (including interbasin transfers), and in
general, exert as much authority as the in-state authority typically can exert over any river
basins contained within the state.
An interstate compact is authorized by the constitution and requires Congressional
approval. It is usually initiated by the states and must include all states in the river basin
unless they opt not to participate.
A compact governing the surf ace waters of the Savannah would require that North
Carolina be invited to participate, although its interests are rather modest. A compact
governing the coastal aquifer would involve Alabama and Florida as well. Groundwater issues
have been addressed in a peripheral way in some compacts, notably the Pecos River compact ,
but generally they were not as central an issue as they are in the lower Savannah region.
Realistically, it would be difficult to obtain Congressional approval for an interstate
compact on the Savannah to which the federal government is not a party, as it is on the
Delaware Basin Compact. This is true because of the heavy Corps involvement on the upper
Savannah. Thus, the choice between Option #4, an interstate compact, and Option #5 , an
interstate/federal compact, may be dictated by the fact of a substantial federal role on this
river.
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Option #5: An Interstate/Federal Compact
The fifth and final option is a formal compact to which the federal government is a party.
This option also involves substantial delegation of authority to plan for and manage the river
to the commission specified in the compact. However, the commission would normally
consist of appointees of the governors and the president, thus reserving some degree of
control.
To the extent that the pressing current issue between Georgia and South Carolina is
groundwater along the coast, this option is not the best solution. There is no need for federal
involvement in resolving groundwater problems. To the extent that problems involving
surface water are the primary concern, such a compact might be a suitable vehicle.
One advantage of federal participation is that it increases the likelihood of federal
approval for the co mp act and federal financial aid in the carrying out its provisions. A
careful study of the reasons for the choice between an interstate compact and an interstate/
federal compact in the numerous other existing compacts would be helpful before making a
decision between these two final options.

Conclusion
If South Carolina is interested in pursuing interstate cooperation or at least resolution
of interstate conflicts along the Savannah basin, including groundwater, there are multiple
approaches, ranging from retaining the status quo and relying on the courts to a formal and
binding interstate/federal compact. In order to pursue any of the more formal arrange
ments, the fo Ilowing preliminary steps should be taken:

(1)

ldentification of sources of conflict to be resolved.

( 2)

Careful review of differences in South Carolina and Georgia water law that need
to be addressed.

( 3)

Establishment of a working group with representation at the highest levels of
state government to assess needs and resources for river basin plans and
resources.

( 4)

Full involvement of the legislatures, the governor, and the relevant state and
federal agencies at every step of the process.

The review of experience in other states suggests that such cooperative agree~ents can
be productive and fruitful in promoting the mutually beneficial development and manage
ment of water resources in a shared river basin. The review also suggests that success is not
guaranteed. The fact that there are only two states does not guarantee success; witness the
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Pecos River. A compact is not necessarily better than a river basin commission, or vice
versa, as examples already cited can attest. Thus, it is appropriate to take preliminary steps
now if a workable cooperative arrangement is to evolve in the future.

'
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Notes
1

For a discussion of the content and issues governing such compacts, see Kevin J. Heron
"The Interstate Compact in Transition; From Cooperative State Action to Congresssionally
Coerced Agreements," St. John's Law Review, 60, No.1 (Fall 1985), pp. 1-25.
2

Ibid., pp. 7-9.

3

The case studies for the Colorado, the Columbia, the Yellowstone, the Arkansas, the
Washita, the Ohio, the Delaware, and the Connecticut are based on papers in Unified River
Basin Management (symposium proceedings), edited by Ronald M. North, Leonard B.
Dworsky, and David J. Allee (Minneapolis, MN: American Water Resources Association,
1980).
4

Five of these compacts are described in Paul Elliott "Texas Interstate Water Com
pacts," St. Mary's Law Review, 17 (1986), pp. 1241-1279.
5

The discussion of the Pecos River is based on Marilyn O'Leary, "Texas v. New Mexico:
The Pecos River Compact Legislation," Natural Resources Journal, 2 O, No. 2 (Apr i I 1 98 O),
pp. 396-410.
6

The negotiation of the Red River Compact is described in detail in Margaret Ann
Chapman "Where East Meets West in Water Law: The Formulation of an Interstate Compact
to Address the Diverse Problems of the Red River Basin," Oklahoma Law Review, 38, No.
1 (Spring 1985), pp.1-112.
7

1bid., p. 85.

8

For a discussion of interstate cooperation options from a Georgia perspective, see
Ronald M. North "Interstate Cooperation: River Basin Compacts, Commissions, and Agree
ments," in Georgia Water Resources: Issues and Options, (Athens,GA: Institute of Govern
ment, University of Georgia, 1980).
9

Albert Utton ulnterstate Water Law," in Natural Resources Journal, 24, No. 4
(October 1984), pp. 987-88.

11 Felix

Frankfurter and Albert Landis, "The Compact Clause--A Study in Interstate Ad
justments," Yale Law Journal, 34 (1925), p. 685ff. For a detailed discussion of the
problems associated with litigation, see Chapman, op. cit. (note 6 supra).
12 For

discussion of these goals and how they were not implemented on the Connecticut,
see Bernard B. Berger, Madge 0. Ertel, and Edward R. Kaynor, "Integrated Management of
the Connecticut River Basin," in Unified River Basin Management, edited by Ronald M.
North, Leonard B. Dworksy, & David J. Allee, (Minneapolis, MN: American Water Resources
Association, 1980), pp.175-186.
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